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Pollen Drift: Reframing the Biotechnology
Liability Debate
A. Bryan Endres* & Lisa Schlessinger**
Abstract
The advent of genetic engineering and its application to agriculture
has transformed the rural landscape at a microscopic level. A cursory
glance of current production fails to reveal the underlying legal tensions
at work in post-modem agriculture. The seemingly natural and
necessary event of drifting, sexually viable pollen, however, implicates
legal rights and responsibilities at the farm level with a ripple effect felt
throughout the international commodity food and feed supply chain.
Despite the ubiquitous nature of agricultural biotechnology, disputes
arising from simple pollen drift lack a clear legal doctrine to define the
multitude of subjects implicated, including tort liability, contracts, and
administrative law.
Although others have discussed the limits of traditional tort doctrine
as applied to pollen drift events, to enhance the accuracy of the debate,
this Article evaluates actual cost and return data from GM and non-GM
farmers to highlight the true nature of the assignment of burden and
benefit these legal doctrines impose. We argue that social welfare
maximization requires, in the instance of pollen drift, legislative
assistance in the design of efficient liability rules. We further suggest
that, with respect to liability rules, care must be taken to distinguish
unilateral and bilateral accidents, with the ultimate goal of minimizing
the total costs of preventive action of both parties in light of the expected
damage. This could be done on the premises of negligence and the least-
cost avoider theory, a result that shares the liability burden amongst
conventional and GM farmers alike.
* Associate Professor of Food & Agricultural Law, University of Illinois. This
work is supported in part by the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Hatch
Project No. ILLU-470-309. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the view of the funding agency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to irritating allergy sufferers, pollen is an essential
aspect of agricultural production. Without pollen, food in its current
form would cease to exist as we would be reduced to harvesting
delicacies such as algae for dinner. A single stalk of corn will release on
average 25 million grains of pollen, drifting in the wind in search of a
mate to produce a kernel of corn.' With a projected 90 million acres of
corn2 in the United States alone, the amount of pollen floating about is
staggering. Pollen, unfortunately, does not observe artificial boundary
lines and the formalized rules of property law such as trespass or
nuisance. Rather, viable pollen is captive to the capriciousness of the
1. Martin Bohn, Pollen Drift and Its Impact on Gene Flow Between GMO and
Non-GMO Cultivars 5 (2003) (on file with authors) (citing JEAN EMBERLIN, THE
DISPERSAL OF MAIZE POLLEN (1999)).
2. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., USDA AGRICULTURAL
PROJECTIONS TO 2016, at 21 (2007), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/ersDownloadHandler.ashx?file=/media/1 97549/oce2007 1_1_.pd
f (projecting corn acreage to reach 90 million by 2010).
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wind and other atmospheric conditions. 3 This freedom of movement,
important in a biological sense for genetic diversity, nonetheless presents
a problem for the farmer seeking to plant and harvest a crop free of
genetically modified ("GM") organisms and the attendant food/feed
supply chain attempting to coexist with a commodity-based, international
grain market.4
The farm gate economic value5 of these pollinated corn plants
exceeds 30 billion dollars annually.6 Identity preserved corn (i.e., corn
that must be protected from cross-pollination with other varieties), such
as organic, constitutes approximately seven percent of U.S. corn acres.7
Although relatively small in acreage, the identity preserved corn harvest
commands a significant price premium to account for the difficulties and
risk entailed in producing a genetically pure product. 8  The price
premium enjoyed by organic crops is an important factor offsetting lower
yields, a relationship that will be explored with empirical data later in the
paper. As adoption of genetically engineered corn varieties expands, the
potential for unwanted commingling and difficulty of producing a non-
3. F. Di-Giovanni & P.G. Kevan, Factors Affecting Pollen Dynamics and Its
Importance to Pollen Contamination: A Review, 21 CAN. J. FOREST RES. 1155, 1158
(1991).
4. The most commonly accepted working definition of "coexistence" is from the
Commission of the European Communities: "Coexistence refers to the ability of farmers
to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop production, in
compliance with the legal obligations for labeling and/or purity standards." Commission
Recommendation 2003/556, on Guidelines for the Development of National Strategies
and Best Practices to Ensure the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with
Conventional and Organic Fanning, Annex, 2003 O.J. (L189) 36, 39; see also A. Bryan
Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Biotech World: Exploring Statutory Grower
Protections, 13 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 206, 206-10 (2006) (discussing coexistence
concepts in production agriculture).
5. The farm gate value is the pricing point of the product available at the farm,
without the added costs of transport and delivery charges. Glossary of Statistical Terms,
Farm Gate Price, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION' & DEV.,
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=940 (last visited May 7, 2014).
6. ALLEN BAKER & EDWARD ALLEN, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FEED SITUATION AND
OUTLOOK YEARBOOK, at iii (2007), available at
http://usdaO .library.comell.edu/usda/ers/FDS-yearbook//2000s/2007/FDS-yearbook-05-
10-2007.pdf (noting the most recent yield of 10.5 billion bushels of corn with an average
price of between $3.00 and $3.20 per bushel).
7. AzIz ELBEHRI, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE CHANGING FACE OF THE U.S. GRAIN
SYSTEM 2 (2007), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/ersDownloadHandler.ashx?file /media/201679/err35-_1.pdf
(noting the rise in identity preserved corn acres from 3% in 1995 to 7.2% in 2003).
8. Id. at 3. Some difficulties at the farmer level include a yield drag associated with
a specialty variety, as well as additional production or segregation costs. Id. From the
demand perspective, food processors and others are willing to pay a premium over
conventional grain prices for trait-specific products to improve production and processing
efficiency, enhance product value, or provide "credence" goods such as organically
certified products. Id.
2014]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
GM product likewise increase, 9 transforming the simple act of pollen
drift into a liability inducing event with financial implications.
These issues have recently come into the international spotlight in a
case that is the first of its kind. A farmer in Western Australia, Steve
Marsh, is suing his neighbor, Michael Baxter, for financial damages and
allegations of negligence and nuisance after nearly 70 percent of his 478
hectare farm lost its organic certification after it became contaminated
with Baxter's GM canola material.'0 Baxter, on the other hand, claims
that Australia's organic certifying body standards are unreasonable, and
that he is farming on his land legally and should not have to compensate
Marsh for his decertification." At the heart of this case are two
neighbors with conflicting land uses relying on an ill-equipped tort
system to decide who should be responsible because they cannot sort out
the issue between themselves. 2
Although the above example is from Australia, the same scenario
could just as easily occur in the United States. This Article seeks to
demonstrate why the United States' tort system is not the most efficient
way to decide similar cases of GM pollen contamination between
farmers who share a common boundary, and why, using economic
principles, the legislature is in the best position to regulate this type of
conflict. In Part II, we place the liability problem of pollen drift into
perspective by explaining how such instances occur and further explore
its impact on the agricultural supply chain. We also examine the actual
costs and returns of conventional (GM) and organic corn to help
determine the true impact of different liability regimes and establish
which liability regime best addresses the issue of pollen drift. Within the
liability context, several commentators have addressed the intersection
between modem biotechnology's application to agriculture and both tort
and patent infringement liability from a doctrinal approach. In Part III
we review and critique these proposed liability regimes. Our goal is to
demonstrate the limits of traditional tort doctrines in pollen drift events.
Part IV seeks to integrate principles of law and economics into the
traditional analysis. In Part V we argue that social welfare maximization
9. A. Bryan Endres, Revising Seed Purity Laws to Account for the Adventitious
Presence of Genetically Modified Varieties: A First Step Toward Coexistence, 1 J. FOOD
L. & POL'Y 131, 131 (2005).
10. Colin Bettles, Landmark GM Case Kicks Off, FARM WEEKLY (Feb. 10, 2014,
1:00 AM), http://www.farmweekly.com.au/news/agriculture/cropping/general-
news/landmark-gm-case-kicks-off/2687345.aspx.
11. Australia Genetically Modified Crops Row Goes to Court, BRIT. BROADCASTING
CORP (Feb. 11, 2014, 3:46 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26116628.
12. Damien Carrick, GM Contamination Test Case, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP.




requires, in the instance of pollen drift, legislative assistance in the
design of efficient liability rules modeled on the fence-in rule for
division fences amongst neighboring landowners where one owner has
livestock and the other does not.
II. THE SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS OF GM CROPS
A. GM Crops and Biotechnologies
It may be useful, at this stage, to introduce the main biotechnologies
applied to agriculture. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations ("FAO"), there are three types of
genetic modification methods:
1. "tweaking," in which genes already present in a plant's
genome are manipulated to change the level or pattern of
expression;
2. "close transfer," in which genes are transferred from one
species to another of the same kingdom; and
3. "distant transfer," in which genes belonging to a species of
another kingdom are transferred into a plant (e.g., bacteria
genes into plants). 13
The third method, perhaps, is the most prevalent genetic
modification used in commercial agricultural production. 14 GM com and
cotton often are engineered to incorporate the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
bacterium-a species of another kingdom.' 5 This bacterium, capable of
producing specific proteins called 6-endotoxines, instills insecticidal
properties within the plant, reducing, and often eliminating, the need for
the application of additional insecticides. Another frequent
13. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2003-04, at
16 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/y5160e/y5160e.pdf.
14. See id. at 35. In 2004, the FAO observed:
Almost two-thirds of the field trials in industrialized countries and three-
quarters of those in developing countries focus on two traits: herbicide
tolerance and insect resistance or a combination of the two traits together.
Although insect resistance is an important trait for developing countries,
herbicide resistance may be less relevant in areas where farm labour is
abundant. In contrast, agronomic traits of particular importance to developing
countries and marginal production areas, such as potential yields and abiotic
stress tolerance (e.g. drought and salinity), are the subject of very few field
trials in industrialized countries and even fewer in developing countries.
Id. (citation omitted).
15. Numerous patents have been filed, first for the use of the bacterium in topical
sprays for pest control, and later for its introduction into genetically engineered plants
such as maize, cotton, or rice.
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biotechnology application is the introduction of genes conferring
resistance to broad spectrum herbicides such as glyphosate or
glufosinate. Some experts, however, argue that the introduction and
widespread, indiscriminate use of Bt, glyhposate, or glufosinate is likely
to hasten pest and herbicide resistance.16 Although perhaps the most
controversial genetic modification, and not currently used in commercial
agriculture,' 7 the insertion of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies
(GURTs), 18 would most likely belong to the FAO's first category of
genetic engineering--"tweaking." GURTs prevent the germination of
second generation seed and thus serve as a "built in" prevention to seed
saving and the attending violation of intellectual property rules.
B. Area Planted with GM Crops Worldwide
Genetically modified seeds are grown in more than 20 countries, on
five continents, by 10.3 million farmers.' 9 The total area planted with
GM seeds has increased steadily from 80 million hectares ("ha") in 2004,
to 175.2 million ha in 2013, up 5 million ha from 2012, indicating a three
percent growth rate.2° Since the initial introduction of GM crops in
1996, the United States has devoted more acreage to GM production than
16. See generally Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *9-11
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) (discussing commentators' allegations of glyphosate herbicide
resistance and ordering the agency to review the subject in its Environmental Impact
Statement). Several articles discuss pest and herbicide resistance. See Ian Heap,
International Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds, WEED SCI.,
http://www.weedscience.org/summary/home.aspx (last updated May 12, 2014) (tracking
scientific studies of herbicide resistant weeds). To manage pest resistance to Bt
technologies, the Environmental Protection Agency imposes permit restrictions on the
seed developers, which are passed onto farmers, to plant non-Bt refuges to slow pest
resistance to Bt. Compliance, however, can be a problem. Kay Shipman, Refuge
Compliance Down; Push Made to Reach Growers, FARMWEEK, Jan. 14, 2008, at 1-2.
With respect to herbicide resistance, researchers have documented several instances of
weed resistance to Roundup, the trade name for glyphosate. See Heap, supra.
17. Richard Caplan, The Ongoing Debate over Terminator Technology, 19 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 751, 751 (2007) (noting that GURTs would, for instance, make
seed saving nearly impossible).
18. GURTs can be split into two categories: V-GURTs, which are "restriction
technologies at the variety level where the seed produced from the crop is sterile," and T-
GURTs, which consist of "restriction technologies at the trait level where the seed
produced from the crop is fertile and only expression of a high added-value trait requires
a special treatment." Position Paper of the International Seed Federation on Genetic Use
Technologies (GURTs), SEEDQUEST (July 10, 2003),
http://www.seedquest.com/News/releases/2003/july/6168.htm.
19. CLIVE JAMES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, BRIEF 46, GLOBAL STATUS OF






any other country (70.1 million ha in 2013),21 followed by Brazil (40.3
million ha), Argentina (24.4), India (11.0), Canada (10.8), and China
(4.2).22 Brazil, although second worldwide in GM crop acreage, has
witnessed the fastest growth over the first decade of biotech
commercialization,23 whereas India has shown the largest proportional
(almost three-fold) increase from 2005 to 2006, surpassing China.24
The 102 million ha planted with genetically engineered crops in
2006, however, amounts to only 7.6 percent of the world's cropland.25
Serious debate persists regarding the cost-benefit calculus of agricultural
biotechnology, balancing scientific advancement with the political
realities of each nation.26 For example, despite their relatively advanced
technological status, member states of the European Union (EU) grow
only small amounts of GM plants. Indeed, from 1998 to 2003, the EU
imposed a general moratorium on approval of new agro-biotech
products, which eventually led to the establishment of a World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Panel.27
As exemplified by the European experience, many sectors of the
global food/feed supply chain demand segregation of product into
GM/GM-free pipelines. As a result, coexistence strategies, from farm to
fork, have been adopted along the supply chain to ensure delivery of
21. Id. at4fig.1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. See R. Lal & J.P. Bruce, The Potential of World Cropland Soils to Sequester C
and Mitigate the Greenhouse Effect, 2 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 177, 177 (1999) (noting total
world cropland at 1338 million hectares).
26. Gordon Conway outlined many of the issues surrounding this debate in an
address to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, noting that the
balancing of the benefits and risks of genetic engineering lies solely in the political arena.
Gordon Conway, President, Rockefeller Found., Crop Biotechnology: Benefits, Risks and
Ownership (Mar. 28, 2000), available at http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-
info/articles/biotech-art/conwayspeech.html. Although scientists can provide evidence of
the likely benefits and hazards and the probability of occurrence, "in the end, politicians
needs to decide ... what each country's policy should be." Id.
27. On September 29, 2006, the Dispute Settlement Body issued the long-expected
panel decision in disputes DS291, DS292, and DS293 opposing the EU to the United
States, Canada, and Argentina. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R,
WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006). Plaintiffs, the United States, Canada, and Argentina,
asserted that the moratorium, applied by the EU since October 1998, improperly
restricted imports of agricultural and food products from plaintiffs. These countries also
contended that several EU Member States maintained national bans on import and
marketing ofbiotechnological products despite EU-level approval of those products. The
Dispute Settlement Panel concluded that the general de facto moratorium resulted in a
failure to complete individual approval procedures without undue delay, giving rise to an
inconsistency with Article 8 (control, inspection, and approval procedures) of the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Id. 7.1567-.1570.
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product meeting the required genetic purity standards. Along this route,
however, there are threats from several sources of commingling-any
one of which could produce a liability event.
Similar to the growth in GM plantings, organic food rapidly has
emerged as an important food industry in the United States.28
Underlying motivations for this expansion are often traced to consumer
concerns with food safety and environmental quality, including concerns
about the use of pesticides, food additives, and the spread of GM food
ingredients throughout the food supply.29 In one study, nearly 64 percent
of the respondents had purchased organic food,30 and consumers may be
willing to pay up to 20 percent more for organically grown food. 3' From
a retail perspective, "the average unit margin for organic products
exceeds that of conventional products by 4.2 cents. 3 2 Willingness to
pay higher prices can be considered a valid measure of the value
consumers attach to food.33 However, it is not just consumers who are
recognizing the demand for organic food. Many Cooperative Extension
offices are offering classes to farmers on organic production and
certification as a means to capture the price premiums for organically
grown foods.3 4
28. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofAgric., USDA Announces Growth of U.S. Organic





29. Leila Hamzaoui-Essoussi & Mehdi Zahaf, Canadian Organic Food Consumers'
Profile and Their Willingness to Pay Premium Prices, 24 J. INT'L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS
MARKETING 1, 1 (2012); Qingbin Wang et al., Consumer Preferences and Willingness to
Pay for Locally Grown Organic Apples: Evidence from a Conjoint Study, 45
HORTSCIENCE 376, 376 (2010).
30. Wang et al., supra note 29, at 380.
31. See Hamzaoui-Essoussi & Zahaf, supra note 29, at 6.
32. Jenny van Doom & Peter C. Verhoef, Willingness to Pay for Organic Products:
Differences Between Virtue and Vice Foods, 28 INT'L J. RES. MARKETING 167, 167
(2011).
33. See Hamzaoui-Essoussi & Zahaf, supra note 29, at 1.
34. See Christopher Cumo, High Prices Pique Interest in Organic Corn,
DAKOTAFIRE http://dakotafire.net/farms/high-prices-pique-interest-in-organic-corn/3410/
(last visited May 11, 2014) (explaining the demand for North Dakota State University's
Extension Center to provide classes on organic corn); Tim Thomberry, Growing Corn
Organically Could Prove to be Financially Rewarding for Kentucky Farmers,
KYFORWARD (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.kyforward.com/2013/01/growing-corn-
organically-could-prove-to-be-financially-rewarding-for-kentucky-farmers/ (explaining




C. The Dollars and Cents of Conventional (GM) and Organic (Non-
GM) Corn
One key factor affecting the applicability of the different liability
regimes is the economic reality of the conventional and organic crop
market. Commentators have theorized that the reportedly lower yields of
organic crops render them a less profitable, and therefore a niche
alternative to conventional crops. If organic crops are less economically
efficient, that fact has bearing in the allocation of liability. A crop that is
less profitable and produces less food is arguably contributing less to
social welfare and should bear the burden of its inefficient existence.
This section reviews empirical studies and data to determine whether
organic crops are the lower yield, lower profit alternative. Many will
suspect that at least the first proposition is true, but several studies have
found that under proper management organic crops produce yields equal
to or higher than their conventional counterparts. According to available
data, organic crops are also consistently more profitable per acre than
conventional crops. The authors compared conventional and organic
corn yields and profits due to the fact that corn is an exemplar crop for
pollen drift.35
The U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") has been collecting
average yield and revenue figures for conventional corn since the
1970s. 6 However, no such figures have been maintained for organic
crops. The USDA did collect equivalent figures for organic soybeans in
2006 and wheat in 2009, 37 but the agency has not made any other organic
crop information available to the public.38 The fact that USDA has some
organic data sets indicates that the agency could track organic crops in
the same way it tracks conventional crops, but has chosen not to perform
this service. If the USDA provided equivalent figures for organic crops,
farmers and the general public could more easily compare organic and
conventional crops and assess the economic differences.
In the absence of USDA data, the authors conducted a literature
review to compile production and price data capable of comparison with
data collected by USDA. Our research found that although yield per acre
of organic corn varies across studies, so does the yield per acre of
35. However, the reported cost-profit ratios were similar for other conventional and
organic commodity crops in the studies reviewed.
36. See Documentation, Commodity Costs and Returns, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commodity-costs-and-
retums/documentation.aspx#.U2-MhK1 dWDQ (last updated May 1, 2014).
37. Organic Costs and Returns, Commodity Costs and Returns, U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC. , http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commodity-costs-and-returns/organic-
costs-and-returns.aspx#.U2-NZ6 ldWDQ (last updated May 1, 2013).
38. Organic dairy information is also available for the year 2010. Id.
2014]
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conventionally grown corn. This variability reflects the unavoidable
differences in management techniques, soil quality, weather and other
inputs. "
Kathleen Delate and her colleagues at Iowa State University
conducted a four-year study of conventional and organic commodity
crops to compare yields under different crop rotations.4 0 Delate and her
colleagues found that while conventional yields were significantly
higher, the rotation of crops mattered. A full year of alfalfa before
planting corn gave the organic corn a yield only four and a half percent
lower than conventional corn.4 1 The lowest organic corn yield was just
over ten percent lower than conventional corn yield.42 Interestingly, the
organic corn did not show significantly more pests or weeds than the
conventional counterpart.4 3 In an extended version of this study, Delate
and her colleagues found that organic farming was a competitive
economic enterprise as long as compost costs were less than 20 dollars
per ton.44 If compost costs rose higher than 20 dollars per ton, an alfalfa
rotation was necessary to keep the organic corn competitive. 5 As long
as this requirement was met, the financial per acre returns for both of the
studied organic rotations were significantly greater than the conventional
46rotation.
Catherine Badgley and a team from the University of Michigan also
concluded that organic yields were competitive with conventional
yield.47 Badgley conducted a metastudy of 293 data sets, the majority of
which were peer-reviewed publications, along with some conference
presentations and research station websites.48  Some of the data sets
represented one growing season while others included 20 years of
observation. 49 The observations were made in both the developed and
39. See Verena Seufert et al., Comparing the Yields of Organic and Conventional
Agriculture, 485 NATURE 229, 229 (2012).
40. KATHLEEN DELATE ET AL., COMPARISON OF ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL CROPS
AT THE NEELY-KINYON LONG-TERM AGROECOLOGICAL RESEARCH (LTAR) SITE 1 (2002),
available at http://extension.agron.iastate.edu/organicag/researchreports/nk02ltar.pdf
41. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2 tbl.2.
44. Kathleen Delate et al., An Economic Comparison of Organic and Conventional




46. Id. at 2.
47. Catherine Badgley et al., Organic Agriculture and the Global Food Supply, 22
RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD SYSTEMS 86, 86 (2007), available at
http://www.organicvalley.coop/fileadmin/pdf/organics-can feed-world.pdf.




developing world with no attempt to skew the sample towards organic
growers.50  Badgley's research showed that organic corn51 yields in
developed countries ranged from 84 percent12 to 130 percent53 of
conventional yields. The average organic corn yield in developed
countries was 97.6 percent of conventional corn yield.54 In developing
countries, the situation is even more promising for organic corn. The
lowest organic yield Badgley's team observed in developing countries
was 109 percent of conventional yield,55 and the highest was 371 percent
of conventional yield.56 The average organic corn yield in developing
countries was 205 percent of conventional yields.57 Of course, some of
the yield differentials found in developing counties may be due to the
absence of the highest-yielding, new seed varieties.
U.S. yield data are more modest, but nonetheless far from the epic
economic failure often reported. Researchers with the USDA's
Sustainable Agricultural Systems Laboratory found organic corn yields
to be 76 percent of conventional yields, and organic yields could be
increased by 30 percent with improved crop rotation.58 The Rodale
Institute also found that organic and conventional corn yields were nearly
equal in typical years, 59 and organic yields were actually 30 percent
higher than conventional yields in years of drought.60 Organic corn was
also considerably more profitable per acre, with organic corn seeing a
return of 558 dollars per acre versus conventional corn's 190 dollars.6'
Rodale is not alone in reporting data indicating organic corn as the
more profitable alternative to conventional corn. The preceding
discussion illustrates that the yield difference between conventional and
organic corn varies, with organic corn typically somewhat lower than
conventional. However, yield is not the only factor. Price per bushel
also must be considered in order to compare per acre profit scenarios for
50. Id.
51. Only the figures for commodity corn were used; sweet corn figures were
excluded.
52. Observed in South Dakota. Badgley et al., supra note 47, at 98 tbl.A1.
53. Observed in Ohio. Id.
54. Math conducted by the authors based on figures reported by Badgley et al. Id. at
97-98 tbl.A1.
55. Observed in China. Id. at 103 tbl.A1.
56. Observed in Guatemala. Id.
57. Math performed by authors.
58. Organic Corn: Increasing Rotation Complexity Increases Yields Substantially,
SCIENCEDAILY (June 1, 2008),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/05/080528102904.htm.
59. RODALE INST., THE FARMING SYSTEMS TRIAL: CELEBRATING 30 YEARS 9 (2011),
available at http://66.147.244.123/.-rodalein/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/FSTbookletFINAL.pdf.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 14.
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organic versus conventional corn. For conventional corn, the authors
used the USDA's 2011 data for return and yield per acre62 to reach the
profit per bushel result in Table 1. The USDA data is used to achieve a
"returns per acre" calculation for conventional corn in Delate's study.
As noted above, the USDA does not have equivalent data for organic
corn. Therefore, we used an organic corn budget prepared by Iowa State
University-a leading agricultural research institution. 63 This budget,
with returns per 150 bushels, was used to calculate the profit per bushel
outlined in Table 1. While the organic data is an estimate, it is
nonetheless grounded in empirical research.
62. Overview, Commodity Costs and Returns, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commodity-costs-and-retums.aspx (last updated
May 1, 2014) (select "Recent Costs and Returns: Corn" from the "Data" drop-down
menu; then click on Excel file titled "U.S.: 1996-2000, 2001-04, 2005-09, 2010-13").
63. Craig Chase et al., Organic Crop Production Enterprise Budgets, IOWA ST. U.,
http://www.extension.iastate.edu/AGDM/crops/htmil/a -18.html (last updated July 2011).
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Yield as Bushels per Profit per
Percentage of Acre
64  Acre6 5
Conventional
USDA Conventional N/A 145 $269.70
DELATE ET AL.
" Conventional N/A 179 $332.94
" Organic 1 95.5% 171 $1,126.89
" Organic 2 89.9% 161 $1,060.99
Badgley et al.
" Highest 130% 188 $1,182.25
* Lowest 84% 122 $763.91
" Average 97.6% 141 $887.59
SCIENCEDAILY 76% 110 $691.16
Table 1. Yields and Profit Estimates of Studies
A more recent meta-analysis of 66 studies on crop yield
comparisons, including the studies discussed above, illustrated that the
average organic-to-conventional ratio for corn was .86 (meaning organic
corn yields are only 14 percent lower than conventional corn yields.66
This ratio is based off of 74 observations from 19 different studies; 69 of
the 74 observations were from U.S. fields.67
The empirical data collected by the preceding studies and
summarized in Table I demonstrates that organic corn, despite
64. The USDA conventional figure is an average of the last seven years of yield.
Commodity Costs and Returns: Data, USDA/ERS (June 4, 2012),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/testpick.htm. To achieve the bushels per
acre figure for Badgley and ScienceDaily, the authors multiplied the USDA's bushels per
acre for conventional corn (145) against the percentage figures given by the respective
articles. Thus, the exact figures would likely change from year to year and even field to
field. However, the ratios would remain the same. All figures were rounded to the
nearest whole number.
65. The profit per acre amount was reached by multiplying the bushels per acre
figure times a profit per bushel figure. Conventional and organic corn have different
profit per bushel figures. The conventional figure was achieved by using the average of
the USDA's figures for return per acre for the last seven years ($270.56) and dividing it
by the average of the USDA's figures for bushels per acre for the last seven years (145).
Id. This math resulted in a profit per bushel for conventional corn of $1.86. The organic
profit per bushel figure was reached by taking Iowa State's estimate of $987.77 for 150
bushels and dividing the dollar amount by the 150. Chase et al., supra note 63. These
figures were rounded to the nearest whole cent. Obviously, costs-and therefore returns
per bushel-will vary depending on the price of multiple inputs. Thus, these figures can
be seen only as estimates, but estimates based in research and actual returns.
66. Seufert et al., supra note 39.
67. Id. at 229 fig. 1 (c); Interview with Verena Seufert, Dep't of Geography & Global
Envtl. & Climate Change Ctr., McGill Univ. (Feb. 28, 2014).
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sometimes lower yields, can be more profitable per acre than its
conventional counterpart. We qualify our conclusions with "can be"
because the USDA data for conventional crops cannot account for the
inherent variability in agricultural production across regions.
Additionally, the USDA profit per bushel figure does not include subsidy
payments and other government incentives in place for conventional
commodity production, ranging from international marketing programs
to university extension assistance.
While the data uncertainty makes predictions difficult, the aggregate
of research shows that organic corn should not be considered inherently
less economically efficient than conventional corn, even when subsidies
are considered. This finding has implications for allocating liability and
the burden of segregation.
III. LIABILITY ISSUES ARISING FROM POLLEN DRIFTS: THE CURRENT
TORT REGIME
Agricultural production starts and ends with the seed. As noted
sociologist Jack Kloppenburg stated, seeds are "the irreducible core of
crop production on the farm and the most fundamental agricultural
input. 68 Other commentators noted, "Nothing is more fundamental to
agriculture and our food supply than seeds. Whether eaten directly or
processed through animals, seeds are the ultimate source of human
nutrition. The variety, abundance, and safety of foods are all dependent
on the availability and quality of seeds. 69  Commingling at the seed
production stage sets in motion a disruptive chain of events rippling
through the agricultural system.7v For example, a study published by the
Canola Council of Canada noted that even a small amount of GM seed,
as low as one-fourth of a percent, may result in as many as 1,500 off-type
plants per acre."
68. Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant
Biotechnology, 1492-2000, at 4 (1988).
69. Margaret Mellon & Jane Rissler, Union of Concerned Scientists, Gone to Seed:
Transgenic Contaminants in the Traditional Seed Supply 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food-and-agriculture/seedreport-fullreport.pdf.
70. A recent example of the potential economic devastation resulting from genetic
contamination of seed supplies is the trouble experienced by the rice industry in 2006. A
regulated and unapproved-for-export genetically engineered rice variety contaminated the
foundation seed supply for rice, resulting in the halt of export shipments and extensive
genetic testing. For a full discussion of the issue and resulting class action litigation, see
A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, the Common Law of Biotechnology and
Economic Liabilty Risks, 13 Drake J. Agric. L. 115, 132-35 & nn. 107-21 (2008).
71. Eric Johnson et al., Canola Council of Can., Ecology and Management of
Volunteer Canola 3, available at
http://ws373847.websoon.com/uploads/managing-vol-canola.pdf. See generally Endres,
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Other potential sources of admixture include pollen drift between
neighboring fields, commingling during harvest or post-harvest activities
(such as transportation or storage) and volunteer plants12 from previous
growing seasons. As our focus in this paper is a critique of the liability
system arising from pollen drift, we will not discuss the latter sources of
potential genetic impurity.
Because pollen tends to ignore field boundaries, conventional open-
pollinating crops may be pollinated by genetically modified plants.
Several studies have investigated the incidence of pollen drift for various
crops. A literature review conducted by the extension service of the
University of Illinois noted that the distance pollen can be carried varies
according to the crop73 and the wind patterns observed.74 Other factors
supra note 9, at 134 (discussing the need for revised seed purity laws to better manage
coexistence efforts in light of the increased use of genetically engineered seeds).
72. Volunteers are plants that grow spontaneously, without human intervention, as a
result of some tubers or seeds remaining in the soil after harvest. They can occur with
conventional as well as GM plants. For instance, in a field planted with canola, volunteer
wheat and barley, at 7 to 8 plants/m2, can reduce canola yield by 10 to 13%. Weed
Management, Canola Council Can., http://www.canolacouncil.org/canola-
encyclopedia/weeds/weed-management/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2014). In the genetic
engineering context, the most famous, and troubling, case of unwanted volunteers
involved the commingling of non-regulated soybeans with corn genetically engineered to
produce pharmaceuticals. Volunteer corn plants from a field trial were harvested the
following year along with the soybean crop and commingled in a grain elevator with
500,000 bushels of other soybeans, resulting in the forced destruction of the elevator's
contents. ProdiGene, Inc., the company responsible for the field tests, entered into a
consent agreement with the USDA and the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in
which it paid a civil penalty of $250,000 and agreed to reimburse the government for its
costs in securing approximately 500,000 bushels of soybeans in storage. Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Announces Actions Regarding Plant Protection Act
Violations Involving ProdiGene, Inc. (Dec. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2002/12
/0498.html.
73. See Mike Gray, Pollen Drift and Refuge-Management Considerations for
Transgenic Hybrids, Bulletin (April 17, 2003),
http:/Ibulletin.ipm.illinois.edu/pastpest/articles/200304e.html. For example, a Canadian
study of canola pollen drift found that, in "field studies conducted in Saskatchewan where
Polish canola was grown beside an herbicide-resistant Argentine canola field, hybrids
were detected at frequencies of 0.11% at 40 m and dropped below 0.0 1% at distances of
60 to 250 m from the edge of the Argentine canola field." Johnson et al., supra note 71,
at 2. In a 1950 study, well before the era of genetic engineering, Professors Jones and
Brooks measured the average level of cross-pollination in corn as up to 25.4% in
immediately adjacent rows, dropping to 1.6% at 200 meters and 0.2% at 200 meters. See
M.D. Jones & J.S. Brooks, Effectiveness of Distance and Border Rows in Preventing
Outcrossing in Corn, Okla. Agric. Experiment Station Technical Bull. T-38 (1950); see
also Graham Brookes et al., GM Maize: Pollen Movement and Crop Co-Existence 6-8
(2004), available at http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/Maizepollennov2004final.pdf
(reviewing the scientific literature of pollen dispersal); Bohn, supra note 1, at 5-6
(reviewing scientific literature of cross pollination in corn). On the other hand, farmers
planting self-pollinating crops, such as soybeans and rice, for the most part need not take
coexistence measures related to pollen drift. See Endres, supra note 9, at 148-51
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include temperature, humidity,75 and even the size and shape of the
field.76
When considering pollen drift, notions of open and closed ranges, a
legal doctrine developed to establish liability rules for livestock, come to
mind. Like livestock, pollen tends to wander. Unlike livestock, the fine
particles of pollen are impossible to control with traditional fences.
Thus, the following sections will address application of various
established liability regimes in the unfamiliar context of drifting pollen.
We focus here on four torts, namely trespass, nuisance, strict
liability, and negligence. Each common law cause of action has unique
elements potentially applicable within the context of pollen drift. On the
other hand, each tort suffers from certain limitations that hinder
straightforward application to this specific agricultural situation.
Accordingly, in the following sections we will review and critique these
liability regimes with a goal of demonstrating their limits with respect to
pollen drift events and justifying our subsequent recommendations for a
new law and economic based approach to liability described in Part V.
A. The Original Environmental and Land Use Torts: Trespass and
Nuisance
Although the difference between trespass and nuisance may be
murky in some situations, and are in fact derived from similar
language-trespass and trespass on the case (now referred to as
nuisance)-one clear distinction between the two hinges on the nature of
property right infringed. As summarized in Martin v. Reynolds Metals
Co.,77 "an actionable invasion of a possessor's interest in the exclusive
possession of land is a trespass; an actionable invasion of a possessor's
interest in the use and enjoyment of his land is a nuisance."78 With this
admittedly simple construct, we proceed to analyze the respective tort
(discussing an EU proposal for varying levels of seed purity depending upon whether the
plant is cross- or self-pollinating).
74. See Gray, supra note 73.
75. Neil E. Harl, Biotechnology Policy: Global Economic and Legal Issues 12
(paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Lundberg Family Farms, Woodland,
CA, Jan. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/-harl/BiotecnologyPolicy-Califomia.pdf.
76. Large rectangular fields result in pollen travelling farther than small circular
fields due to higher pollen concentrations. Moreover, the depth of a field, in relation to
wind direction, may be more important than the overall acreage of a particular field.
Brookes et al., supra note 73, at 6.
77. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
78. Id. at 792 (emphasis added); see also Fagerlie v. City of Willmar, 435 N.W.2d
641, 644 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 622 (5th ed. 1984).
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claims to conceptualize application in the event of damage from pollen
drift.
1. Trespass
A trespass traditionally consists of a voluntary and intentional or
negligent 79 act of unauthorized entry upon, or physical contact of an
object with, another's land.80 Modem constructions of the tort reduce the
claim to three elements: invasion, causation, and harm."' One potential
difficulty with the traditional application of the tort in the event of non-
negligent pollen drift is establishing the intention of the trespasser.
Moreover, the traditional definition of intentional trespass requires the
invasion to be direct and the injury immediate.82 In light of these
requirements, Professors Heald and Smith argue that the traditional
approach to trespass would most likely not apply to pollen drift situations
for two reasons.8 3 First, for pollen drifts to occur, a carrier (i.e., the
wind) must be at work, making the entry less direct.84 Second, the injury
is not immediate, as crops need time to grow post-pollination. 85 Unlike
the learned opinions of Professor Heald and Smith, these purported
difficulties with a trespass claim, in our view, are relatively minor under
both the traditional and modem applications of the tort.86
Although an intentional tort, a trespasser does not have to intend or
even expect the damaging consequences of the trespass. 87  Rather, the
plaintiff only must establish that the trespasser intended the act which
79. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 250-51 (N.Y. 1954).
80. See Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 2005 SKQB 225, para. 127 (Can.). It
must be noted here that the analogy between pollen drifts and stray bulls (that we used in
introduction, not specifically with respect to trespass) was rejected by the Canadian court.
The court argues that "[t]hese are not trespasses cases. The imposition of strict liability
for the consequences of stray bulls is clearly a policy decision intended to place a heavy
onus on the owners and possessors of bulls to keep these animals confined and under
control." Id. para. 132.
81. Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in a
Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87, 136 (2006) (citing Richard A. Repp,
Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop
Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 585, 600 (2000)).
82. Baumann v. Snider, 532 S.E.2d 468, 472 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
83. Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 135.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Professors Heald and Smith do acknowledge that, under the modem view of
trespass, liability could be found by some courts. Id. at 135 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965); Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602
N.W.2d 215, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980)).
87. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 250-51 (N.Y. 1954).
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amounted to or produced the entry onto the plaintiffs land.88  It is
axiomatic that the farmer cultivating genetically engineered corn
intended to plant the crop. Corn is an annual rather than a perennial
species, and thus requires seeding each growing season. Moreover,
although every farmer may not be an expert in plant science, even the
most inexperienced farmer knows that corn is a cross-pollinating crop
that produces extensive amounts of pollen-an essential element of corn
production and thus an inevitable and intended consequence of growing
corn. Although there may be no specific intent or even desire to have the
pollen drift in the wind beyond the farm's borders, the undoubtedly
intentional act of planting and growing corn produced the ultimate entry
onto the land of another.89
With respect to the traditional trespass elements of direct and
immediate harm, a careful reading leads us to conclude that the terms
refer more to the concept of the proximity of the harm rather than its
temporal nature. As one court noted, "the intrusion must at least be the
immediate or inevitable consequence of what [the trespasser] willfully
does." 90 Inevitability refers to the likelihood of a consequence rather
than timing. Pollination is an inevitable consequence of planting corn.
Likewise, wind capable of transporting the pollen is an inevitable feature
of nature and an event the corn plant has relied upon for reproductive
evolution since its creation. Narrowly defining "directness" and
"immediacy" of the invasion without consideration of the environment's
natural forces and inevitable consequences of the corn grower's actions
fails to consider the harm's proximity.
Several jurisdictions applying the modern elements of trespass-
invasion, causation, and harm-have imposed liability for airborne
pollutants9' without the separate establishment of "direct" and
"immediate." As noted by Heald and Smith, those jurisdictions
"obviously will be predisposed to apply the same rule for bystanding
farmers whose crops are damaged by GMO pollen., 92 Causation, often
cited by commentators as a potentially difficult element to satisfy,
88. Id. at 251.
89. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights and the
Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 235-36 (2002) (discussing application of trespass
to pollen drift); see also Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 118.
90. Phillips, 121 N.E.2d at 251 (emphasis added); see also Merlino v. City of
Atlanta, 657 S.E.2d 859, 862-63 (Ga. 2008) (holding that although the act itself may not
have been wrongful, the consequences of the act could constitute a trespass).
91. See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979); Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959); Thomas P. Redick & Christina G.
Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the Prevention of "Genetic Pollution ": Declining a Dinner
Date With Damocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10328, 10336 (2000).
92. Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 136.
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especially if the plaintiffs contaminated field is surrounded by several
fields of genetically modified plants, 93 actually may be a relatively
simple element to prove. The same technology responsible for creating
the genetically engineered plant endows the plant with a unique genetic
construct capable of determination through DNA testing. As Monsanto
Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser94 has shown, DNA fingerprinting can be
conducted in most instances. Similar DNA testing is conducted with
most identity preserved grain shipments and even international
commodity shipments to destinations with restrictive genetic engineering
policies. 95 In sum, the process of DNA testing is straightforward and
should simplify the causation analysis. One potential complication could
occur if all the surrounding farmers planted a variety with the identical
genetic modification. In those instances, principles of joint and several
liability could apply. 96
The final element in modern trespass jurisdiction-harm-has some
unique attributes in the agricultural sector. For example, in Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Co., the plaintiffs land was held unfit for livestock
grazing after contamination by microscopic fluoride particles emitted by
the defendant's plant.97 In the organic context, it is possible that repeated
contamination from pollen drift could result in the land losing organic
certification and thus not only the price premium applied to "organically
certified" land, but also the higher value of crops produced on
organically certified land in compliance with organic production
methods. 98
93. Id. at 114-15.
94. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.);
see infra Part V.
95. Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Jury Verdict Against Bayer for Liberty
Link Rice Breaks New Ground in Biotech Liability, 26 AGRIC. L. UPDATE (Am. Agric. L.
Ass'n, Kelso, WA), Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 2, 3-4., available at
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/aala/I 1+ 12-09.pdf.
96. Grossman, supra note 89, at 233 (citing Repp, supra note 81, at 607).
97. Harl, supra note 75, at 16. Harl cites (along with Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959)) Hall v. De Weld Mica Corp., 93 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. 1956), in
which a cloud of silicon dust was found likely to create damage; and Stevenson et al. v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2003), in which Texas law was
construed to allow trespass claims for land contamination caused by airborne emissions.
See also Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 138, for a discussion of a Texas case, Schronk
v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), in which the plaintiff's crops were
damaged by pesticides dropped from an airplane. The court upheld the trespass claim,
although such instances are generally considered to be in the remit of negligence. Id. at
745.
98. See Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 129; Transcript of Proceedings, Marsh v.
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Even in the non-organic context, Christopher Rodgers notes that in
England, "[u]ntil severed from the soil, crops are part of the land to
which they are attached, and an alteration in the genetic makeup of one's
crops would, in principle, constitute damage to property in the same
terms." 99 In the United States, perennial crops (e.g., alfalfa) are fructus
naturales and thus considered a fixture of the land. 100 Accordingly,
genetically engineered pollen drift could alter the nature of the non-GM
alfalfa, and thus the land itself. The property status (personality or
realty) of annual crops is a function of their maturity (growing verses
ready to harvest) as well as the law of the particular state. In some
jurisdictions, annual crops are fructus industrales at all stages of
development, and thus personal property. 10' In Illinois and several other
states, immature crops not yet ready to harvest are considered realty.'°2
In those jurisdictions, pollen drift altering the genetics of growing crops
would be a harm to real property and thus fit within the trespass
construct.
2. Nuisance
Several commentators have discussed the concept of nuisance,
including the distinction between public and private nuisances. 
103
[A] public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread or so
indiscriminate in its effects that it would not be reasonable to expect
one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop
99. Christopher P. Rodgers, Liability for the Release of GMOs into the Environment:
Exploring the Boundaries of Nuisance, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 371, 385 (2003) (citing Law
of Property Act 1925, § 205).
100. See Triggs v. Kahn, 167 A.D.2d 680, 681-82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding
that perennial five-year alfalfa is part of the realty).
101. See Spauldin v. Spauldin, 945 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that annual crops are personal chattels, independent and distinct from land); Heinold v.
Siecke, 598 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Neb. 1999) (holding that growing crops are personal
property); see also Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 138 (referencing the general point of
personal property and referring to StarLink Corn Products).
102. Loepker v. Wesselman, 569 N.E.2d 321, 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
growing or standing crops are part of realty until severed); see also Balla v. Ireland, 196
P.2d 445, 449 (Or. 1948) (holding that beans and squashes (annual crops) are real
property until severed from the land); Williams v. State, 209 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tenn. 1948)
(holding that stalk of growing corn is part of the soil and thus realty and is not personal
property until severed); Woody v. Wagner, 154 P. 819, 820 (Wash. 1916) (holding that
crops, whether growing or ready for harvest, are part of real property until severed).
103. See A. Bryan Endres, "GMO:" Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic
Monetary Obligation? The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and
the European Union, 22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 453, 491-94 (2000);
Grossman, supra note 89, at 230-35; Repp, supra note 81, at 605-07.
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to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the
community at large. 104
"Private individuals may maintain a public nuisance only if they 'have
suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other member of
the public .... ,,,105
Courts generally limit application of public nuisance to
unreasonable conduct that (a) significantly interferes with public health,
safety, peace, or comfort; (b) is illegal; or (c) is of a continuing nature
that has a significant, long-lasting effect upon the public. 106 Although
pollen drift potentially could rise to the level of a public nuisance, in a
simple cross-pollination scenario between neighboring farms, the general
public does not suffer an unreasonable interference. The harm in this
case is confined to the farmer with the contaminated crops and the
doctrine of public nuisance may not be applicable.'07
Conversely, the doctrine of private nuisance may provide pollen
drift plaintiffs with a slightly more viable opportunity for recovery.1
0 8
"A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on the disturbance of rights in
land,"' 1 9 specifically the unreasonable interference with the individual's
use and enjoyment of his or her property." 0 As noted by Professor
Rodgers, "[w]ere the courts to refuse a remedy for the unconsented
genetic alteration of a claimant's produce by cross-pollination from
nearby GM crops, this would render his property right contingent." 1 '
The complaint in a private nuisance action is either the creation of
an unreasonable physical harm to the plaintiffs property, or an
unreasonable interference with plaintiff's use of her land. 1 12  Stated
another way, nuisance refers to the condition created by the defendant
104. John Wightman, Nuisance-The Environmental Tort? Hunter v. Canary Wharf
in the House of Lords, 61 MOD. L. REv. 870, 884 (1998) (quoting Attorney-General v.
P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 169, 191 (Can.)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821 C(2) (1979).
105. Endres, supra note 103, at 492 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
821C(1) (1965)).
106. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8211B(2)(a)-(c) (1965)); see also
Grossman, supra note 89, at 231-32 (citing Amended Complaint, Higg[i]nbotham v.
Monsanto Co., No. 1:99cv03337 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2000)) (discussing potential public
nuisance actions brought against the seed developer rather than the farmer).
107. Endres, supra note 103, at 492.
108. Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 115; see also In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab.
Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 845 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("We agree that drifting pollen can
constitute an invasion, and that contaminating neighbors' crops interferes with their
enjoyment of the land.").
109. Harl, supra note 75, at 18.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
111. Rodgers, supra note 99, at 380.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
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rather than the harm-causing conduct of the defendant.' 13 Although the
initial characterization of the nuisance concerns the type of harm, courts
will assess conduct in order to assign liability. At this point, a distinction
is made between intentional and negligent nuisance. Liability for
intentional nuisance requires conduct causing an invasion that is both
intentional and unreasonable. 114  In contrast, liability for negligent
nuisance may arise from unintentional conduct that nonetheless may be
actionable under the rules for negligent or reckless conduct, or
involvement of abnormally dangerous conditions/activities. 5
Unlike the intentional element of a trespass claim-which only
examines whether the actor intended to conduct the act, and not the
intention to inflict harm 116-the intentional invasion of another's interest
element of an intentional nuisance claim requires the actor to act for the
purpose of causing the invasion or with the knowledge that the invasion
is substantially certain to occur. 117 The American Law Institute ("ALl")
considered the distinction between intentional and unintentional in two
illustrations discussed in the comments of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. In the first scenario, A owns a factory and neighboring landowner
B operates a poultry farm. 118 There is a small stream that flows from A's
land to B's land, which B uses for his poultry farm. 119 A, with
knowledge that B uses the stream and that dumping would interfere with
B's use-but with no desire to harm B-dumps ten barrels of waste from
the factory into the stream and fouls the water in such a way that it is a
substantial interference with B's poultry farm. 120  The ALl found that
this scenario is an example of A's intentional invasion of B's interest in
the use of his land. 121 On the other hand, the ALI provides an example
of an unintentional invasion of a nuisance claim when the stream is
replaced by a ground well on B's land, and A dumps the waste into a
hole on his land that then, unknowingly to A, seeps into the groundwater
113. 4 J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §
35:7 (2d ed. 2008) (citing Sletten v. Ramsey Cnty., 675 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2004);
Guzman v. Des Moines Hotel Partners, Ltd. P'ship, 489 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1992)),
available at Westlaw MTLLL (last updated 2013); id. § 35:1 ("[M]uch of the confusion
in nuisance law is because of the failure to recognize that nuisance refers to the interest
invaded and not to the type of conduct that subjects the defendant to liability." (citing
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d 658 (Wis. 2005))).
114. Id. § 35:7; see also Grossman, supra note 89, at 233.
115. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 113, § 35:7; see also Grossman, supra note 89, at
233.
116. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 cmt. c (1979).






and contaminates B's well so that he is unable to use the water for his
poultry farm. 122 Thus an intentional invasion may be difficult to prove in
a GM pollen drift contamination case; unless the plaintiff has proof the
GM farmer (defendant) knew the organic status of the plaintiff's farm.
The "unreasonableness" analysis in both intentional and negligent
nuisance claims relates to the invasion-the interference with the
property right-not the conduct of the defendant, 2 3 and is perhaps where
much of the confusion lies with regard to providing a precise definition
of the tort. The unreasonableness analysis is a utility balancing exercise
in which the court will weigh the gravity of the harm with the utility to
society of the defendant's conduct. 
24
This balancing of factors renders nuisance a flexible approach,
which subjects the doctrine to both praise as a factor of adaptability in an
evolving society, and vilification as a source of legal uncertainty. 125 The
tort's evolutionary flexibility renders it susceptible to frequent test cases
seeking to broaden legal boundaries and is therefore a likely candidate
for biotechnology litigation (or any transformative technology released
into the environment).
An additional element taken into account by the Restatement is the
relative sensitivity of the plaintiff's land use. It is a well-established
principle of private nuisance that "a man cannot increase the liabilities of
his neighbour by applying his own property to special uses, whether for
business or pleasure."' 126 Professor Rodgers notes that "[a]lthough the
'hypersensitive land use' principle was not directly at issue in R. v.
122. Id. § 825 cmt. d, illus. 3.
123. See LEE & LLNDAHL, supra note 113, § 35:9 (noting that reasonableness when
assessing negligent nuisance does not mean "due care" but refers to a balancing of social
utility and harm); id. § 35:8 (stating test from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 for
balancing gravity of harm with defendant's utility when considering liability for
intentional nuisance).
124. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 826-31 (1979). Pursuant to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the following criteria are taken into account in
determining the utility of the defendant's land use: (1) the social value that the law
attaches to the primary purpose of the defendant's conduct, (2) the suitability of the
conduct to the character of the locality, and (3) the impracticability of preventing or
avoiding the invasion. Id. § 828. The criteria relating to the appraisal of the harm are
defined as follows: (1) the extent of the harm involved, (2) the character of the harm
involved, (3) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded, (4) the suitability of the use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the
locality, and (5) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. Id. § 827.
125. See David Campbell, Of Coase and Corn: A (Sort o) Defence of Private
Nuisance, 63 Mon. L. REV. 197, 203 (2000); Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 124 n.167;
see also William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942)
(referring to nuisance as a legal garbage can).
126. E. & S. African Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Cos., [1902] A.C. 381 (P.C.)
393 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Secretary of State ex parte Watson,[ 127] the Court of Appeal discussed the
difficulties that would be faced by an organic producer seeking to
establish liability" for nuisance as a result of pollen drift. 128  He
concluded, however, that "[d]espite the reservations expressed in ex
parte Watson, there is no logical justification for regarding either organic
or 'ordinary' arable cropping practices as hypersensitive land uses for the
purposes of the law of private nuisance."1
29
Similarly, the Hoffman case pitted organic growers against
Monsanto. The growers alleged pollen drift from genetically engineered
canola, and the Canadian court held: "The plaintiffs' claim is novel, and
there are difficult hurdles to overcome. However, I do not find it plain
and obvious that they cannot succeed in showing that the damage or
interference they have alleged constitutes a legal nuisance."'
' 30
Although the Canadian common law, as illustrated in the Hoffman
case, has adopted a slightly different approach to nuisance, the
underlying condition giving rise to a nuisance is similar to the United
States' standards. 131 The difference between jurisdictions seems to lie in
the court's investigation as to the type of harm resulting from the
activity. Where the plaintiff alleges physical harm to her land, the
Canadian court need not assess whether the use made by the defendant of
her own land was reasonable or not, nor consider the character of the
local environment. 32  Such a balancing of circumstances, and in
particular the appraisal of the character of the locality in order to
determine the standard of comfort the plaintiff may expect, will take
127. Rodgers, supra note 99, at 389-90 (explaining that in this case, it was decided
that the testing of GM maize in a field adjoining that of the plaintiff's organic maize crop
was not unreasonable, insofar as the scientific evaluation had established a likelihood of
cross-pollination of one kernel in a thousand if the crops were planted 200 metres apart,
while the actual distance between the two crops was two kilometres).
128. Id. at 393.
129. Id. at 394.
130. Hoffman Canada Inc. v. Monsanto, 2005 SKQB 225, para. 110 (Can.). The
"hurdles" alluded to are the fact that, unlike pesticide drifts, adventitious GMO pollen is
not inherently harmful to crops, id. para. 106, that growing GM canola is not an
"unreasonable" use of land in Saskatchewan, and that the "activities of organic farmers
are said to raise [an] issue of hypersensitivity." Id. para. 107.
131. Compare Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene
Wandering in Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 554-55 (2004) (describing nuisance in
Canada as "an unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land, causing
either physical damage to the land or injury to the health, comfort, or convenience of the
occupier"), with supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing private nuisance in
the United States as "the unreasonable interference with the individual's use and
enjoyment of their property.").
132. Glenn, supra note 131, at 556.
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place only where the claim relates to an interference with use of, rather
than harm to, the land. 1
33
Where a genetic alteration of plants is not regarded as damage to the
land itself,134 the claim can only be in relation to an interference with
land use, and thus the defendant's use and the character of the locality
have to be assessed. The "locality" test focuses on the predominant land
use in the geographical area concerned. Thus, according to Professor
Rodgers, if an area has declared itself "GM free", the introduction of GM
technologies on one farm is more likely to constitute an actionable
nuisance. 135 This is similar to the discussion of the suitability of an
activity to a particular area in § 827(d) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. As noted in the comment to that section of the Restatement, if a
particular use or enjoyment of land is well suited to the locality, an
interference with it is more serious than if the use is not suited to the
locality. 36 The analysis, therefore, focuses on the condition interfered
with (the plaintiffs activity and appropriateness to the locality) rather
than the activity of the defendant.'
37
In the United States, the "locality" test is embodied in the various
right-to-farm laws enacted by many states with agricultural activities.
38
According to Professor Harl, there are two types of right-to-farm laws.
The first codifies the "coming to the nuisance defense" and will protect
an agricultural operation only if it predated the "nuisance" or change in
the nature of the surrounding area, and if it complied with any state or
federal requirements (e.g., permits).139 "The second type of right-to-farm
statute is designed to prevent local and county government from enacting
regulations or ordinances that impose restrictions on normal agricultural
practices."' 140 That is, the second type of right-to-farm laws will ensure
that local governments cannot pass local laws that change the
requirements for agricultural enterprises. For instance, Texas law states
133. This paragraph draws on Hoffman Canada Inc. v. Monsanto, 2005 SKQB 225,
para. 100 (Can.) (quoting 1 G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF TORTS 1N CANADA 126-30 (1st
ed. 1989)).
134. See Douglas H. Kenyon & Lionel S. Popkin, Recent Decisions, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 612, 615 (1920) (discussing status of growing crops in relation to real versus
personal property).
135. Rodgers, supra note 99, at 381.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1979).
137. See id.
138. See Grossman, supra note 89, at 233-34 (discussing applicability of right-to-
farm laws to pollen drift scenario); see also Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 121.
139. Harl, supra note 75, at 21; see also Grossman, supra note 89, at 233-34
(discussing right-to-farm laws within the context of genetic engineering).
140. Harl, supra note 75, at 21; see also A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a
Biotech World: Exploring Statutory Grower Protections, 13 Mo! ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
206 (2006) (discussing state preemption of local initiatives to regulate biotechnology).
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that any laws passed by governments other than city and state
governments will not affect farms already in existence,141 and that city
government laws will not affect farms outside the corporate boundaries
of the city. 142
Right-to-farm laws, therefore, make nuisance a difficult claim to
sustain against a farming operation. Attempting to claim nuisance for
pollen drift may be especially difficult. Pollen drifting, after all, is an
entirely natural and expected process. It is caused by no unreasonable
action of the farmer, and it will happen even if farmers follow all
ordinances and regulations currently imposed. Furthermore, the second
type of right-to-farm laws would make it difficult to enact local
legislation that would make pollen drift a nuisance moving forward. As
if right-to-farm laws were not enough of a hurdle, a nuisance suit for
pollen drift will also have to contend with the economic loss rule.
The economic loss rule is "the prevailing rule in America,"
' 143
holding that a mere economic loss, absent some harm to property, is
insufficient to obtain tort recovery. 144 Nuisance is no exception to this
rule. In order for a plaintiff in a nuisance case to recover, he must show
that he has suffered some damage other than pure economic loss.145
These non-economic damages can be fairly broad. In fact, a plaintiff in a
nuisance suit "may recover all consequential damages flowing from the
injury to the use and enjoyment of his or her person or property. 146
However, non-economic damages must be shown. When considering
pollen drift as a potential nuisance, it is important to note that the harm
need not be to personal property. The consequential harm in a nuisance
claim can be consequential harm to real property. 147 This fact aside, the
necessity that a claimant prove consequential, rather than pure economic,
damages could be difficult for farmers claiming nuisance for pollen drift.
Farmers grow crops to sell as commodities; thus, convincing a court that
the farmer has lost anything but a decline in revenue may be challenging
in a nuisance claim between two neighboring farmers.
141. TEX. AGRIc. CODE ANN. § 251.005(b)(l)-(2) (West 2009), available at
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/righttofarm/texas.pdf. If the
farm is established after the law is passed, however, then the farm will have to comply.
Id.
142. Id. § 251.005(c). If the farm is later incorporated into city limits, the farm still
does not have to comply with the law unless it is "reasonably necessary to protect persons
who live in the immediate vicinity." Id.
143. In re Chi. Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ill. 1997).
144. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (N.D. Ill.
2002) ("Physical injuries to persons or property are compensable; solely economic
injuries are not.").





However, in two different cases of farmers suing seed companies
for nuisance because of pollen drift and GM contamination of the
harvest, the courts have found that pollen drift and the resulting
commingling of crop types constituted a physical injury sufficient to
survive a challenge under the economic loss doctrine. 48 Both cases
involved the contamination of the food supply by GM products that were
not yet approved by the FDA for general commercial release, a situation
unique from a farmer growing approved GM plants that contaminate
organic crops. 149  These cases, although not identical to the farmer-
versus-farmer contamination situation discussed in this Article, hint at
the potential for an organic farmer to successfully prove more than pure
economic loss for pollen drift based on the concept that GM
contamination is a form of physical injury.
B. Alternative Causes of Action: The Conduct-Related Torts of Strict
Liability and Negligence
Although traditional land use doctrines of trespass and nuisance
provide some insight, strict liability and negligence rules, analyzed in
greater detail below, complete the theoretical common law liability
landscape for agricultural biotechnology. To frame our discussion of
strict liability, we first discuss the rule defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. 150
After briefly exploring strict liability, we turn to negligence and the once
again important practical distinction of the economic loss rule.
1. Rylands v. Fletcher: Still a Strict Liability Rule?
The remit of the rule laid down by the Court of Exchequer and
affirmed by the House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher requires some
clarification. According to Judge Blackburn's dictum, the person who
collects on his land "anything likely to do mischief if it escapes" must
keep it at his peril, as he will be "answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape."1
5 1
148. A. Bryan Endres, An Evolutionary Approach to Agricultural Biotechnology:
Litigation Challenges to the Regulatory and Common Law Regimes for Genetically
Engineered Plants, 4 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 59, 74 (2012); In re Genetically Modified
Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1016-17 (E.D. Mo. 2009); In re StarLink Corn Prods.,
212 F. Supp. 2d at 841-43.
149. Endres, supra note 148, at 78.
150. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 (H.L.) 330 (appeal taken from Eng.).
151. John Murphy, The Merits of Rylands v. Fletcher, 24 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD.
643, 653 (2004). A discussion of whether this liability regime also applies to cases of
personal injury, unlike nuisance originally, or only if the plaintiff has an exclusive
proprietary interest in the land he occupies, as Lord Lloyd required in Hunter v. Canary
Warf Ltd., is beyond the scope of this note.
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As noted by John Murphy, the phrase "anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes" has largely been supplanted by the word
"dangerous." 152 Likewise, Stephen R. Munzer observes that "American
courts interpreted the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher as applicable mainly to
abnormally hazardous things or activities." 153 Judge Posner, in Indiana
Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. ,154 offers a further
restriction: "ultrahazardousness or abnormal dangerousness is, in the
contemplation of the law at least, a property not of substances, but of
activities."
Conversely, as the United Kingdom House of Lords posits in
Transco plc v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, "many things
not ordinarily regarded as sources of mischief or danger may nonetheless
be capable of proving to be such if they escape. I do not think this
condition can be viewed in complete isolation from the non-natural user
condition." 155  The House of Lords points here to a dangerous,
uncommon use of the land, rather than to the dangerous nature of the
thing stored on it. Moreover, a use of the land might be uncommon
without being unreasonable. 
156
The second relevant criterion is whether the damage was reasonably
foreseeable, as in nuisance cases. As noted by Lord Hoffinann in
Transco, deciding that the defendant should nevertheless be held liable
where the escape was not reasonably foreseeable is akin to internalizing
the costs of an enterprise. 157  Lord Hoffmann then enumerates the
limits 58 put to the rule set out in Rylands v. Fletcher. In particular, the
152. Id. at 662 (noting that the dangerous nature of the thing, or of the use of land-in
this case biotechnology-should be assessed).
153. Stephen R. Munzer, Plants, Torts, and Intellectual Property, in PROPERTIES OF
LAW ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 189, 200 (Timothy Endicott, Joshua Getzler, &
Edwin Peel eds., 2006).
154. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir.
1990).
155. Transco plc v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, [2003] UKHL 61, [10],
[2004] 2 A.C. 1 [10] (appeal taken from Eng.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jd031119/trans-I .htm.
156. Id. at [11] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
157. Id. at [29] (Lord Hoffmann of Woodborough).
158. Lord Hoffmann explains in Transco that: "within a year of the decision of the
house of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher, Blackburn J. advised the house that, in the absence
of negligence, damage caused by operations authorised by statute is not compensatable
unless the statute so provides." Id. at [30] (citation omitted). Thus, the rule in Rylands
does not cover a use of land proper for the general benefit of the community, such as
works constructed or conducted under statutory authority; neither does it apply to acts of
God (defined as unusual natural events, such as heavy rains, but also a rat gnawing a hole
in a wooden gutter box) or acts of a third party, as these were defenses identified by
Blackburn J. in Rylands, (insofar as the defendant does not have any control on these
elements), or to really high-risk activities.
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rule has been later understood in England and Wales' 59 as applying only
to cases where the damage is the natural, foreseeable consequence of the
escape. This interpretation tends to merge the rule in Rylands into the
tort of negligence. However, we contend that this assimilation of the two
regimes is disputable. What "natural"' 160 means when opposed to
"consequence of its escape" is that the resulting damage is the
unavoidable result of such an escape, and not that it was foreseeable.
The rule in Rylands, understood as a strict liability one in Canada,
as a regime of liability for highly dangerous activities in the United
States, and subsumed within the tort of nuisance in England and Wales,
has been "absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence" in both
Australia 6'1 and Scotland. 162 As aptly criticized by John Murphy:
[T]o allow the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to be swallowed up by the
law of negligence would mean that in some cases claimants would
face insurmountable evidentiary burdens, burdens, indeed, that may
be thought inappropriate as a matter of policy and justice.... [I]t can
be seen that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher provides a viable option
for redress where a necessarily fault-based law of negligence would
not. 163
Indeed, the plaintiff would need to show a breach of the duty of care
owed by the persons in control of the thing that creates damage by
escaping, where the very existence of such a duty in the first place would
be difficult to establish in some instances. Thus, a stand-alone rule of
strict liability, as Rylands was intended to be, for land-related damages 1
64
might still be justified and, as discussed below, potentially apply in
scenarios of pollen drift.
159. Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc, [1994] 2 A.C. 264 (H.L.)
306 (appeal taken from Eng.) (requiring that nuisance claims under Rylands be for only
foreseeable damages).
160. Conversely, when the use of the land at stake is said to be a "natural" one,
natural has to be construed as meaning "common," "ordinary."
161. Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd. (1994) 179 CLR 520, 556,
quoted in Transco plc, [2003] UKHL at [93] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe).
162. Scotland has chosen to depart from Rylands v. Fletcher by establishing a fault-
based rule in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd. v. Strathclyde Regional Council, (1985)
S.C.(H.L.) 17 (Scot.), with Lord Fraser of Tullybelton describing the suggestion that the
rule in Rylands formed part of the law of Scotland as "a heresy which ought to be
extirpated." Id. .at 41.
163. Murphy, supra note 151, at 659-60 (footnotes omitted).
164. This regime of strict liability is distinct from that applying in the field of product
liability, which cannot be developed here.
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2. Strict Liability
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the
elements of strict liability as: (1) the probability of an accident is great,
(2) the harm that would ensue from this accident could be great, (3) the
accident could not be prevented by the exercise of due care, (4) the
activity is not a matter of common usage, (5) the activity is inappropriate
in the place in which it took place, and (6) the value to the community
does not offset the costs in the event of an accident. 161
As Judge Posner, in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 16 6 distinguished, the necessary care standard in
negligence is different from the level of care required in strict liability
situations. Although this distinction is often blurred, due care, in the
negligence sense, requires "average" care. Strict liability is premised on
different principles-not average care. Each of the six factors identified
in the Restatement "is a different facet of a common question for a
proper legal regime to govern accidents that negligence liability cannot
adequately control." 167  None of them suffices and the presence of
several is required for strict liability to be found in a given situation.
Therefore, the exercise of due care to prevent an occurrence is not a
determinative factor as it is in negligence litigation because, by
definition, strict liability accidents often cannot be prevented by due care.
Prior commentators have discussed the application of strict liability
to the pollen drift situation. 168  Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 169 a
Washington Supreme Court case, provides a straightforward analogy. In
that case, the court applied the strict liability regime to a case of
contamination of an organic farm by airborne particles-in this instance,
pesticides. The court did not find it necessary to assess whether the
Plaintiffs specialization in the organic food business was abnormally
sensitive to the Defendant's conduct. It simply noted that the "same
factors that produced a high degree of risk of harm were not possibly
eliminated by the use of reasonable care."" On the other hand, the
court held in Hoffman v. Monsanto that GM crops were not unnatural or
dangerous per se.171 Moreover, depending upon the crop, it may be
165. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977).
166. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir.
1990).
167. Id. at 1177.
168. Endres, supra note 103, at 473-75.
169. Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
170. Id. at 222; Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 129.
171. Hoffman Canada Inc. v. Monsanto, 2005 SKQB 225, para. 100 (Can.).
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possible to exercise some amount of care in the agronomic sense to
prevent if not the pollen drift, at least the damage from the pollen.
17 2
3. How Does Negligence Apply to Pollen Drift Events?
Before trying to apply rules of negligence to such situations, it is
worth recalling the economic justification of this regime of liability.
Negligence can be construed as the failure to take optimal care to avoid
foreseeable accidents. 173 The principle more generally applied has come
to be known as the "Hand Formula," announced by Judge Hand in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 174  It consists in determining
whether the burden of precaution is less than the costs of the accident
multiplied by the probability that such accident occurs. When such is the
case, it is negligent not to take precautions to avoid the accident.
However, as explained by Judge Posner in McCarty v. Pheasant Run,
Inc.,'75 "this is a distinction without a substantive difference .... The
formula translates into economic terms the conventional legal test for
negligence."
Clearly, pollen drifts qualify as foreseeable events, insofar as this is
precisely what the reproduction of cross-pollinating plants is based upon.
The questions that concern us here, in relation to the application of
negligence rules to pollen drift events, are how can the injured party
show the existence of a duty of care, what would this duty consist of, and
who would owe it to whom?
Farmers who decide to buy genetically modified seed enter into a
contract with the seed company (which generally has applied for or
obtained a patent to protect its seeds), either directly or through a
"shrink-wrap" license affixed or printed on the bag containing the
seeds. 176 The primary purpose of these contracts is to reserve the seed
breeder's intellectual property rights. 177  A secondary purpose is to
provide notice of some agronomic or marketing restrictions. These could
include the mandatory planting of non-genetically engineered (or
172. See Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 111 (discussing buffer zones).
173. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972).
174. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
175. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
176. See generally Heald & Smith, supra note 81, at 114-15.
177. A. Bryan Endres, State Authorized Seed Saving: Political Pressures and
Constitutional Restraints, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 323, 325 (2004); Keith Aoki, Weeds,
Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
247, 255 (2003).
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engineered with a different trait) seeds to manage resistance pressuresl78
or even a notice to sell the harvested crop in approved marketing (e.g.,
domestic only) channels.1
79
Seed company license agreements could, but as a general rule do
not, include a notice given by the seed company to the GM farmer
concerning some drift prevention measures:
* Fencing (with pollen barriers),
Where possible (depending on the number of neighboring
farmers and on the crops they plant) adopting a crop rotation
system or minimum time intervals between the cultivation of
GM and non-GM crops of the same species. This would
require consultation between GM, conventional and organic
farmers in the area and use of crop varieties with different
flowering times,
Cover tassels with bags in order to avoid cross-pollination
with other farmers' crops of the same species (although
possible in theory, this measure would be particularly
cumbersome and costly in practice).
In sum, several alternative strategies are available to minimize or
even prevent the impact of pollen drift. Thus there is some argument that
taking these measures is an aspect of due care. However, use of
negligence as a cause of action for pollen drift is complicated by a
familiar issue: the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule,
discussed more thoroughly above, states that a claimant is not entitled to
recovery in a tort proceeding unless he can show he has suffered more
than mere economic losses.' Negligence, like nuisance, requires a
showing of physical damage.' 81 Thus, farmers who choose negligence as
their cause of action against pollen drift face the same problem as
farmers who choose nuisance; they must prove that the loss of their crops
is more than a pure economic loss.
Where the GM seed company has given notice to the GM farmers,
and these farmers have not implemented the measures required in order
to avoid contaminating neighboring fields, the GM farmers failing to
178. See MONSANTO, 2014 TECHNOLOGY USE GUIDE 4-5 (2013), available at
http://www.monsanto.com/sitecollectiondocuments/technology-use-guide.pdf (discussing
restrictions on the use of GM seeds in order to prevent insect resistance).
179. Know Before You Grow, NAT'L CORN GROWERS ASS'N,
http://www.ncga.com/for-farmers/know-before-you-grow (last visited May 12, 2014)
(providing recommendations for farmers to select seeds that have approval for export
markets).
180. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
181. In re Chi. Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ill. 1997)..
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implement such measures could be held liable for negligence. Another
possibility would be to shift the liability burden on the non-GM farmer
should he be the least-cost avoider. This would lead to a no-liability
result where the non-GM farmer failed to take necessary precautionary
measures and contamination of his field resulted.
Another solution would consist in enticing all operators involved to
share the costs of prevention of pollen drifts, and the liability burden.
Presumably each party assuming responsibility for contamination
prevention measures where they are the least-cost avoider. For example,
the GM farmer may have lower costs for installing fencing, establishing
a buffer zone, or assuming cleanup costs of "decontamination" of non-
GM farmers' fields. Similarly, non-GM farmers would implement those
measures for which they are least-cost avoiders, lest the compensation
for the loss of their premium resulting from the adventitious presence of
GM plants in their fields would be reduced due to their contributory
negligence.
Overall, non-GM farmers will be willing to take measures to avoid
adventitious presence of GM plants, or pay compensation to GM farmers
for them to take such measures or to abandon cultivation of GM crops, so
long as the premium farmers receive for their non-GM produce exceeds
the costs of precautionary measures or compensation paid to GM
farmers.' 82 Similarly, GM farmers will stop growing GM seeds if the
costs of isolation (fencing, buffer zones) or the amount of damages paid
to conventional farmers exceed the benefits derived from higher yields
resulting from GM crop production. 183
We contend the economically efficient allocation is to place the
burden of precautionary measures regarding pollen drift on the GM
producer. First, the developer of GM seeds (and thus the farmer-
customers of these products) are in the best position to evaluate the risk
of pollen drift due to greater access to information than other farmers.
Thus, these market participants may more aptly internalize the cost of
risk in their prices. Secondly, and relatedly, it can be argued that users of
GM seeds may present the greatest risk. The theory of reciprocal risks
states that the party that creates "a risk greater in degree and different in
order" from the other party or parties has created a nonreciprocal risk for
182. This analysis is an application of the Coase Theorem, as discussed in R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
183. See generally VOLKER BECKMANN, CLAUDIO SOREGAROLI & JUSTUS WESSELER,
GOVERNING THE Co-EXISTENCE OF GM CROPS: Ex-ANTE REGULATION AND Ex-POST
LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND IRREVERSIBILITY (Volker Beckmann & Konrad
Hagedorn eds., 2006), available at http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/1 2618
(ICAR Discussion Papers).
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which that party should be held responsible.1 84  GM companies are
creating synthetic crops which pose a far greater risk to non-GM growers
than users of non-GM growers impose on their neighbors. Thirdly,
owing to higher prices, consumers (here, GM farmers) are more likely to
buy the exact amount they need, rather than too much of seed, as might
be the case under a negligence rule applied upstream onto the GM seed
companies. This is all the more true as seed prices are most likely rather
elastic, because substitutes to GM seeds exist, i.e., conventional seeds for
the same species. This could encourage GM farmers to plant buffers of
non-GM crops along field borders.
As this section has illustrated, perhaps neither trespass, nuisance,
traditional strict liability nor negligence are ideal causes of actions for
dealing with conflicting land uses that on their face are not more
intensive or better suited to the land than the conflicting use. But if we
reframe these traditional tort doctrines under a theory of social welfare
maximization, there is greater clarity on how the law may evolve to
better resolve the farmer versus farmer scenario.
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION, THE LEAST-COST AVOIDER,
AND THE COEXISTENCE APPROACHES
The proceeding sections are meant to illustrate the risks of organic
farming in the United States. Not only is there the ever-present danger of
commingling and pollen drift from neighboring GM farms that can
jeopardize an organic farmer's return on investment; the contamination
might be enough to cause the organic farmer to lose organic certification
on the land, which is a costly and time consuming process. 185 However,
as we address below, society values organic food and is willing to pay a
premium for the benefits that organic food provides. 186 Yet under the
current tort regime, there is no predictable protection or redress for an
organic farmer to shield their investment and livelihood should a GM
farmer start farming on neighboring land. This may have the perverse
effect of causing organic farmers to switch to conventional fanning to
avoid unprotected economic losses, despite society's demand for organic
food. Of course, absent some special circumstances, the GM farmer is
also using his land in a productive and legal way, even though it conflicts
and potentially harms his neighbor's use. When faced with two
conflicting land uses that are both legal, how does the law decide who to
favor? The following section contemplates allocation of liability using
184. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537,
542 (1972).
185. See supra Part II.
186. Wang et al., supra note 29, at 376.
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economic principles to show that implementing a coexistence regulatory
system is a better, more predictable model than relying on the current tort
system.
As we have discussed throughout this Article, the current tort
system is not set up to predictably or efficiently decide who should be
held liable for the burden of preventing pollen drift between an organic
and GM farmer, and may even exclude such cases entirely based on
right-to-farm statutes."' In his now famous paper, The Problem of
Social Cost, R.H. Coase considered how to allocate liability when there
was no clear wrongdoer and the damaging business is not liable for any
of the damage it causes, situations that he identified as an example of the
reciprocal nature of harm. 188 In such situations, the real task for the
decision maker is deciding whether A should be allowed to harm B or if
B should be allowed to harm A? 189 If society establishes rules to prevent
pollen drift (harm) to the organic farmer by placing the burden of the
underlying prevention measures on the GM farmer, then the GM farmer
is harmed because he cannot plant as much GM crop on his land. Coase
explains that the only way to determine who society chooses to harm is
to know the value of what is obtained in comparison to the value of what
is sacrificed to obtain it. 190 Once we know the value, Coase claims that
the proper procedure for deciding which side to favor is comparing the
total social product yielded by these different arrangements-looking to
see which side maximizes social welfare by being able to "fix" the harm
at a lower social cost. 191
If an accident can be avoided by only one person, absolute liability
is sufficient to create incentives for this person to avoid such an accident,
insofar as the costs incurred by this liability do exceed the costs of
precautionary measures. 192 However, where several persons could avoid
the accident, some might tend to free-ride on the others' efforts, which
results in a sub-optimal level of precaution. In the now classic model
devised by Calabresi and Hirschoff, liability rests on the "least-cost
avoider", i.e., the person who could avoid an accident at the lowest cost,
irrespective of the level of care taken by this person. 
193
"Calabresi and Hirschoff structured the cheapest cost-avoider test in
a peculiar way: they defined the cheapest cost-avoider as the person best
187. See supra Part Il.




192. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
193. Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider,
78 VA. L. REv. 1291, 1306 (1992).
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suited (1) to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of a particular accident risk,
and then (2) to act on that analysis."' 194  These authors specified,
however, that the party in the best position to make the cost-benefit
analysis might not always be in the best position to act upon it; in such a
case, the decision would require weighing comparative advantages. 195 A
more general formulation of the least-cost avoider principle "simply asks
which party could, at lowest overall cost, have avoided the accident"'96 ,
irrespective of the applicable liability regime. 197 The general position of
Stephen Gilles is that the costs fall on the victim, who supports the
burden of liability in a negligence regime, unless the injurer is shown to
be the least-cost avoider. Guido Calabresi and Alvin Klerovick,
198
quoted by Stephen Gilles, prefer to reverse this rule, so that the costs
would be borne by the injurer, unless the victim is shown to be the least-
cost avoider, leading to a situation of no-liability. 199 In situations where
several persons can take precautions in order to prevent damage from
occurring, in other terms, in joint-care problems identified by William
Landes and Richard Posner (1987), 200 the test becomes "what additional
precautions by each party could have avoided the accident at least
cost,', 20 1 i.e., a marginal least-cost avoider analysis. This creates
incentives for all parties involved to take care.
Overall, the least-cost avoider test is the most efficient allocation of
liabilities in situations where transaction costs would be prohibitive for
conventional, organic, and GM-farmers to contract (on crop rotation or
on sharing fencing costs for instance), because there are numerous, not
always easily identifiable, parties involved (for example multiple borders
with multiple combinations of GM and organic farmers). Additionally,
the least-cost avoider test is more efficient than waiting for a full cost-
benefit analysis by the courts, because trials are time- and resource-
consuming for society. According to Landes and Posner, where
transaction costs are high enough to hinder bargaining, property rights or
liabilities must be assigned so as to minimize transaction costs. 20 2 Thus,
property rights or entitlements are vested on the party who values them
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1307 n.47.
196. Id. at 1308.
197. The phrase "least-cost avoider" is often replaced with that of "best-cost avoider".
The two expressions are equivalent, and mean that persons who can avoid an accident at
the lowest cost should have liability imposed on them.
198. Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 585, 588-89 (1985).
199. Gilles, supra note 193, at 1308 n.48.
200. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 190 (1987).
201. Gilles, supra note 193, at 1310.
202. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 200, at 85-88.
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the most, saving the cost of a transaction. Following this logic of
welfare-maximization, the least-cost avoider analysis should be
conducted by legislators when allocating liabilities in events of pollen
drifts under a regulatory regime.20 3
Borrowing from the economics literature, social welfare
maximization is an economic principle championed by
consequentialists.2 °  Concerned with society's overall welfare,
consequentialists believe that public policy decisions should be based on
the likely outcomes of the different choices, and that regulators should
always choose the policy that results in a better outcome. 20 5 -Determining
the better outcome depends on what social welfare function is used.20 6
Historically, social welfare has been defined as the maximization of
society's wealth, meaning "the sum total of the value of goods and
services available as measured by people's willingness to pay for
them.",2°' Accordingly, if price serves as an accurate representation of
consumers' willingness to pay, then the measure of what all people are
willing to pay for an outcome of a certain policy decision is a reflection
of the wellbeing produced by that decision.20 8 Further using wealth
maximization as a way to measure overall social welfare is useful with
the understanding that people are willing to pay more for an outcome if it
means they are better off.
209
Much of the discussion of social welfare maximization in terms of
organic versus conventional farming has focused on the total yield; the
standard assumption is that organic agriculture has lower yields, and
therefore needs more land to produce the same amount of food as a
conventional farmer, making organic farming a more costly and less
efficient option. 210 The traditional thinking is that the higher yield from
conventional farming translates to more food, which in turn translates to
more revenue for the farmer and is thus better for society's general
welfare. 21 However, as discussed in Part III of this Article, comparing
only the yields of organic and conventional farms is an inaccurate
analysis of social welfare because of the steep price differential between
203. Id.; Gilles, supra note 193, at 1298.
204. Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and
Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 847, 851 (2002).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 853.
207. Id. at 873-74.
208. Id. at 874.
209. Id., at 876.
210. Seufert et al., supra note 39, at 229.
211. Eric F. Lambin & Patrick Meyfroidt, Global Land Use Change, Economic
Globalization, and the Looming Land Scarcity, 108 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. SCIENCES 3465,
3465 (2011).
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212organic and conventional products. A more accurate way to assess
social welfare is to include society's value of the product as indicated by
its price, and not simply yield. In other words the profit per acre
provides a clearer picture of which farming operation contributes more to
total social welfare.
For example, if we look back to Table 1 in Part II of this Article, the
traditional analysis, which compares only yields, would show that GM
results in 179 bushels per acre, while organic, at its reported lowest yield,
brings in 122 bushels per acre. Based on this variable, the organic farm
produces 84 percent of the conventional farm and appears to be the less
efficient use of the land. However, when we look at the overall return, a
different picture of social welfare appears. When examining the returns
per acre, a GM farm receives $332.94 per acre, while an organic farm
receives $763.91 per acre (again we use the most conservative data for
organic profits per acre, yet recall that many of the studies showed higher
yields than the 84 percent used in this worst-case example). Using these
estimates, on a property with 100 acres, a conventional farmer stands to
make a return of $33,294 (100 acres multiplied by the $332.94 profit per
acre), while the organic farmer on the same land would receive a return
of $76,391 (100 acres multiplied by the $763.91 profit per acre).
This example demonstrates that even though the organic yield is
smaller, the returns are greater for the same tract of land. If we alter our
social welfare maximization calculation to focus on the overall returns, it
is clear that the organic farm is more valued by society because society is
willing to pay more for organic food. As mentioned above, social
welfare is maximized by society's wealth, and because the organic
farmer provides more wealth per acre than the GM farmer, the
implication is that organic production is the higher social use of the land.
This conclusion leads us to revisit placement of the legal burden to
prevent cross-contamination via pollen drift.
As described above, there are several ways to prevent pollen drift;
including fencing (with pollen barriers), adopting a crop rotation system,
minimum time intervals between the cultivation of GM and non-GM
crops, use of crop varieties with different flowering times, and physical
covering of tassels.21 3 All of these options require placing limitations on
the use of the land at a cost to the implementing farmer. As mentioned
above, neither the GM nor the organic farmer deserves to pay for this
burden in the general sense that one use is bad or wrong. However, in
order to avoid costly and unpredictable tort claims, the authors suggest a
regulation that decides the issue beforehand. When faced with
212. See supra Part Il.
213. See supra Part IV.
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conflicting uses of land, society must have a way to decide which use to
favor. From an economic perspective, policy makers should select the
use that maximizes social welfare.21 4 If one of the two neighboring
farmers has to sacrifice five percent of his or her production in order to
compensate for the burden of preventing pollen drift, it should come
from the land use that is valued less by society. This will increase social
welfare by preventing the damage at a lower cost. Following this logic,
we should shift the duty of preventing pollen drift onto the GM farmer
because it will cost society less than if the burden rests with the organic
farmer. This idea of shifting the burden onto the least-cost avoider is
discussed in the following section.
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF COEXISTENCE
REGULATIONS
Pollen drift is not the first liability allocation issue that emerged
from landowners sharing common borders with conflicting uses.2 5 For
example, farmers have long dealt with how to manage the cost of
fencing, either in or out, livestock that are capable of destroying a
neighboring farmer's crops.
2 16
A "division" fence is simply a fence that divides two adjoining
landowners with rules allocating the legal obligation to build and
maintain the fence generally outlined via a state statute. 2  There are
currently four types of fence cost-sharing provisions in the United States:
fence-in; fence-out; mandatory cost-sharing; and equitable cost-
sharing. 21 8 The following section describes each of these models.
The traditional English common law rule is the fence-in option.
219
The operation of this rule is relatively straightforward-to prevent
liability from property damage caused by livestock running-at-large, the
livestock owner is required to fence-in her property at her own
expense.22° Of course, nothing prohibited adjoining landowners from
sharing the burden of building and maintaining a common fence and in
practice this is what happened. But if one landowner elected to keep
214. Dorff, supra note 204, at 852.
215. A. Bryan Endres & Lisa R. Schlessinger, A Move Towards a More Fair
Division: Envisioning a New Illinois Fence Act, FARmDoCDAILY (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2012/12/a-move-towards-a-more-fair-division.html.
216. Id.
217. Craig R. Heidemann, Fencing Laws in Missouri: Confusion, Conflict, Ambiguity
and a Needfor Change, 63 Mo. L. REv. 537, 538-39 (1998).
218. Terence J. Centner, Reforming Outdated Fence Law Provisions: Good Fences
Make Good Neighbors Only if They Are Fair, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 267, 280-81
(1997).
219. Id. at 268.
220. Id. at 280.
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livestock, and thus build a fence, nothing prohibited the adjacent
landowner from later making use of this same fence to restrain his own
livestock without compensating for the initial construction costs.
The converse of the English common law rule is fence-out, in which
the livestock owner is not responsible for building fences to confine her
animals, but rather adjoining neighbors who want to keep straying
livestock off their land must bear the burden of paying fence costs.22' A
fence-out policy is more popular in western states where there are large
amounts of open grazing land and the cost of fencing-in ones livestock
over this vast area would be economically infeasible.222 Accordingly, the
law in these areas developed to place the burden on the small-landholder
seeking to keep livestock out of their homestead yard. Although
declining in use, perhaps due to development pressure, a few fence-out
223jurisdictions remain.
Mandatory cost-sharing regimes require adjoining landowners to
share the cost of a division fence to control the livestock owner's
animals, regardless of the corresponding utility a neighbor may receive
from the division fence.224 In essence, whenever one landowner is
willing to pay half the funds to build a fence between the properties, the
adjoining landowner is burdened with the other half of the fence costs.
225
From an economic perspective, this rule may be efficient when the
majority of landowners in a jurisdiction graze livestock. This prevents
the "free-rider" problem of the common law fence-in rule whereby the
adjoining landowner can take advantage of the fence erected by the
neighbor without compensation. On the other hand, a system that
requires payment for an unneeded fence can be burdensome and
oppressive to the non-livestock owning landowner.226
The equitable cost-sharing model is a hybrid of the original fence-in
rule along with mandatory cost-sharing. As in the fence-in rule,
livestock owners bear the burden of building and maintaining an
adequate fence to restrain their livestock.227 However, if an adjoining
neighbor has livestock, or later decides to acquire livestock, a cost-
sharing provision is triggered to ensure that all landowners benefiting
from a fence also share in the cost.
228
221. Id. at 269.
222. Id. at 268-69.
223. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 43 (1991).
224. Centner, supra note 218, at 281.
225. Id. at 282.
226. Id.; see also Sweeny v. Murphy, 334 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (App. Div. 1972)
(finding a mandatory cost sharing fence law to be oppressive when defendant owned 110
dairy cows and plaintiff neighbor kept no livestock).




Thus far, the default rule for pollen drift buffer zones for crop
production has been an informal "fence-out" rule, meaning the organic
farmer must cover the cost and land for the buffer zone. 229 However, this
approach may not maximize social welfare and rather reflect the
economic and political influence of the large agribusiness and
chemical/biotechnology industry. 230 In the alternative, a coexistence
regulation that codifies and mirrors what state legislators have adopted
for fence laws across the United States would provide an improvement to
society.
If the farmers each have a 100 acre farm, as previously
demonstrated in the social welfare maximization section, above, a GM
farmer would receive a return of $33,294 while an organic farmer would
receive a return of $76,391. If five acres are required for a buffer zone to
minimize pollen drift between the two cornfields, we can calculate the
costs of "sacrificing" the five acre buffer zone.231 If the organic farmer
must implement the buffer zone (an application of the fence-out rule), the
farmer would lose five percent of his return, a total of $3,849.55. On the
other hand, if the GM farmer must implement the buffer zone (an
application of the fence-in rule), the GM farmer would lose five percent
of his return, a total of $1,664.70, a substantially lower financial loss
than the organic farmer.
However, the figures calculated above illustrate only part of the
economic story. Even though the organic farmer must segregate the
harvest into two supply chains, the farmer can plant organic for the
majority of the harvest and conventional-non-GM corn in the five acre
strip, which means that 95 acres will fetch the organic rate of return and
five acres will bring in a return based on a conventional-non-GM
23price, 232 resulting in a total loss of $2501.05 (The difference in the cost
of 100 acres of organic return and a combined total of 95 acres of organic
and five acres of conventional-non-GM corn). 233 But, the organic farmer
does so at a risk of commingling non-organic corn with the organic corn,
resulting in the entire harvest being designated as commodity grade and
losing a greater amount of money because the entire yield of the 100
acres would be calculated at the conventional-non-GM return per acre
instead of the organic return per acre.234
229. Endres, supra note 148, at 64.
230. Id. at 74.
231. Id. at 67.
232. For the non-GM conventional rate of return we are using the USDA
conventional data from Table 1 that has a lower yield than GM farms of 145 per acre and
has a rate of return per acre of $269.70.
233. Endres, supra note 148, at 67.
234. Id.
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Conversely, if the GM farmer must implement the buffer zone while
taking into account that five acres would bring in the rate of return per
acre for conventional-non-GM corn, then the GM farmer would only lose
$316.20 if he is unable to plant GM corn on all 100 acres. This
application of the rule is less risky than to the organic farmer, because
even though the GM farmer must also plant two varieties of corn, at
harvest the GM farmer does not risk losing the GM value of the 95 acres
like the organic farmer does by planting non-organic seed in the five acre
buffer zone.235
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that society can maximize
total welfare if the GM farmer bears sole responsibility for the buffer
zone. Not only does the buffer zone result in less risk for the GM farmer
in terms of management costs and return, but the buffer zone costs less
overall for the GM farmer to maintain. On the other hand, the organic
farmer would suffer a greater actual loss and be at risk of even great loss
if the same buffer zone is his responsibility.
An alternative liability allocation of mandatory and equitable cost-
sharing modeled on the 50-50 rule for division fence and placing
responsibility on each farmer to supply 2.5 acres of the buffer zone on
their land would be inefficient because both farmers would incur the
management costs. 23 6 Additionally, it would still be more costly for the
organic farmer to sacrifice 2.5 acres of land ($1,250.52)237 than it costs
the GM farmer to cover the entire ten foot buffer zone ($316.2). Such an
arrangement would fail to maximize social welfare.
As the calculations have shown, the fence-in rule, allocating the
liability to the GM farmer, is the most efficient legislation because it
both maximizes social welfare and assigns the burden of prevention on
the least-cost avoider. Because of this, the authors recommend that
states implement a fence-in rule that places liability for the buffer zone to
prevent pollen drift on the GM farmer.
This Article has attempted to show the limitations of traditional
torts in resolving pollen drift disputes and the currently vulnerable
position of non-GM farmers. We argue that the legislator may best
positioned to step in and design specific liability rules that maximize
social welfare as opposed to relying on the courts to resolve this issue in
a piecemeal fashion. We have suggested that this could be done on the
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. This figure was calculated by taking 97.5 acres and multiplying it by the rate of
return per acre for organic corn ($769.91) and then taking 2.5 acres and multiplying it by
the rate of return per acre for conventional-non-GM corn ($269.70). Once these two
figures were added together, the total was subtracted from 100 acres of organic corn
($76,991) to come up with the cost of covering half the buffer zone.
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premises of the least-cost avoider, with legislation modeled after current
division fence laws-an allocation of responsibility and liability that has
longstanding acceptance in the agricultural community. Under this
model, the liability for pollen drift prevention rests with the GM farmer.
This is a shift in the current legal approach, but one that could result in
lower costs to obtaining coexistence and thus a net improvement for
social welfare.

